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 FARMS’ TECHNICAL INEFFICIENCIES IN THE PRESENCE OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 
 
 
 
We focus on determining the impacts of government programs on farms’ technical inefficiency levels. 
We use Kumbhakar’s (2002) stochastic frontier model that accounts for both production risks and risk 
preferences. Our theoretical framework shows that decoupled government transfers are likely to 
increase (decrease) DARA (IARA) farmers’ production inefficiencies if variable inputs are risk 
decreasing. However, the impacts of decoupled payments cannot be anticipated if variable inputs are 
risk increasing. We use farm-level data collected in Kansas to illustrate the model. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The analysis of technical efficiency involves the assessment of the degree to which production 
technologies are being utilized. Traditionally, technical efficiency has been measured as the ratio 
of observed output to maximum feasible output. Stochastic frontier models have been widely 
used to assess this issue. When studying producers’ technical inefficiencies, one needs to 
carefully integrate the stochastic component of production into the stochastic frontier models, in 
order to derive reliable information on input allocation decisions, agricultural production, 
production risks, and farmers’ attitudes towards these risks. However, with some exceptions, 
stochastic frontier frameworks have not adequately modeled production risks (Battese et al. 1997; 
O’Donnell et al. 2006).  
As explained by Just and Pope (1978), the common stochastic specification used in the 
economic literature to estimate production functions can be too restrictive. Specifically, traditional 
approximations do not allow the effects of inputs on the deterministic component of production to 
differ from their effects on the stochastic element of output. Since agricultural inputs can either 
increase or decrease output variability, Just and Pope (1978) propose a stochastic specification 
of input-output response to correctly capture this matter. Battese et al. (1997) incorporate the 
structure of the stochastic frontier model into the Just and Pope (1978) flexible risk model. This 
yields a stochastic frontier with additive errors, as opposed to the conventional multiplicative 
framework. The additive stochastic frontier model has a heteroskedastic error structure and yields 
a measure of technical inefficiencies that does not only depend on the stochastic technical 
inefficiency effect, but that is also a function of input allocation since it depends on both the mean 
and standard deviation of production. Specifically, technical inefficiencies are found to have a 
positive relationship with the output risk and a negative association to the production mean. This 
implies that any change in input use will also have an impact on technical inefficiency. Battese et 
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al. (1997) argue that the additive model is likely to better represent production behaviour of 
modern agricultural enterprises. An objective of our article is to test the multiplicative model 
versus the additive one for a sample of U.S. farms that specialize in cereal production. As 
predicted by Battese et al. (1997), we find the additive model to outperform the multiplicative 
framework. We then study the impacts of government farm programs on a farm’s technical 
inefficiency. 
 Analyses of the effects of decoupling of agricultural policies have shown that apparently 
decoupled payments can affect farmers’ risk attitudes, which can have implications for input 
allocation (see Sandmo 1971; or Hennessy 1998). It is thus interesting to study whether these 
changes in input allocation will have any impact on farms’ technical inefficiencies. Previous 
literature on the effects of decoupling has mainly focused on the impacts of lump-sum transfers 
on input use and output levels (see, for example, Hennessy 1998; Oude Lansink and Peerlings 
1996; Sckokai and Moro 2006; Serra et al. 2006). By assuming decreasingly absolute risk-averse 
(DARA) producers, Hennessy (1998) has shown that decoupled government transfers will have 
the effect of stimulating input use and production. Serra et al. (2006) have refined this conclusion 
by showing that, if input use has an impact on output variability, then these payments will only 
lead to an increase in production if inputs are risk increasing. If they are risk decreasing, the 
impacts of decoupled transfers are inconclusive. Nevertheless both analyses find decoupled 
payment effects to be of a rather small magnitude. 
  To our knowledge previous studies on decoupling have not accounted for production 
inefficiencies, nor assessed the impacts of policy instruments on technical inefficiencies. We 
present a theoretical model to analyze this issue. Our theoretical framework is based on the 
model developed by Kumbhakar (2002), which essentially includes risk preferences in the 
efficiency model by Battese et al. (1997). We use this framework, include policy instruments, and 
develop a comparative statics analysis to study the impacts of decoupling on technical 
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inefficiencies. Within the framework of the stochastic frontier with flexible risk properties, we show 
that the effects of decoupled government payments on technical inefficiencies can only be 
anticipated in a single-output and single risk-decreasing input model. This makes the 
investigation of this issue essentially an empirical question. The aim of our empirical 
implementation is to assess the influence of government payments on production inefficiencies of 
a sample of Kansas farmers. Results show that an increase in decoupled transfers is likely to 
increase our sample farms’ technical inefficiencies albeit with a very small magnitude.  
Our article extends Serra et al. (2006), who examined the effects of decoupling on both 
the output mean and variability using the same dataset, in several ways. While Serra et al. (2006) 
estimate a stochastic production function, we use a stochastic production frontier that is more 
consistent with economic theory (Aigner et al. 1977). As noted above, the literature on decoupling 
has not yet accounted for production inefficiencies, nor assessed the impacts of policy 
instruments on technical inefficiencies. In this regard, our model extends the work by Serra et al. 
(1996) along the lines suggested by Kumbhakar (2002). In doing so, and contrary to the paper by 
Serra et al. (2006), our article allows for an assessment of the impacts of decoupling on farms’ 
technical inefficiencies. Also, our paper better represents farmers’ behaviour under risk, since it 
allows for the opposite effects on production of the purely stochastic random shocks and the 
stochastic technical inefficiencies. 
It is important to note here that our paper focuses on “inside-farm” technical inefficiencies 
and that we do not assess the impacts of decoupled programs on the entry-exit decision and on 
the consequent changes in the distribution of the technical inefficiency parameter. We face 
important data limitations to assess the impacts of decoupling on the extensive margin, as we do 
not observe the entry-exit decision. While, with regards to the extensive margin, it may be 
reasonable to anticipate that a policy reform reducing government support to farmers would 
trigger the abandonment of the less efficient farms, anticipating the impacts of decoupled 
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payments on “inside-farm” technical inefficiencies becomes more complicated. As noted above, in 
the additive stochastic frontier specification, technical inefficiencies are found to be positively 
related to the output risk and negatively associated to production mean. From MacMinn and 
Holtmann (1983) and Serra et al. (2006), it can be inferred that decoupled payments are likely to 
increase the use of risk-increasing inputs. However, the question of whether marginal increases 
in output variability will be bigger or smaller than marginal increases in output mean remains 
unanswered and needs to be empirically resolved. It is also true that decoupled payments are 
government transfers not linked to production or yields. If income supports are based on these 
transfers, higher production levels are not receiving any premium, which may reduce incentives to 
produce the maximum attainable output and thus may increase inefficiencies.  
 Our article is organized as follows. In the next section we present the conceptual 
framework. The theoretical model is specified for econometric estimation in the following section. 
The empirical implementation section offers a discussion of the data used and the results derived. 
Concluding remarks are presented in the last section. 
 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
 
A standard feature of conventional stochastic frontier models (Aigner et al. 1977) is that they do 
not allow the impacts of input use on output mean to differ from their effects on the output risk, 
yielding measures of technical inefficiency that are stochastic and that do not depend on input 
allocation decisions. In such a framework, a government program altering input use will not have 
a direct effect on a farm’s technical inefficiency.1 Battese et al. (1997) criticize conventional 
                                                 
1 Conventional stochastic frontier models however can yield technical inefficiency measures that depend inversely on 
the output mean if production is measured in its original units instead of logarithms.  
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models on the grounds that they do not correctly capture production risks and propose an 
alternative formulation to properly predict producers’ technical inefficiencies. As opposed to 
conventional models, the formulation by Battese et al. (1997) has additive rather than 
multiplicative errors. The additive model is more flexible than the conventional multiplicative one 
in that the marginal production risk of an input does not depend on its mean output elasticity. In 
the additive formulation, input use impacts on technical efficiency measures through its different 
effects on the mean and the variance of output.  
 To briefly explain the differences between the additive and the multiplicative models, 
consider a single-output firm that produces output y . A single input is also used in this 
theoretical model for the sake of simplicity. However, in the empirical application the model is 
generalized. Under the additive hypothesis, the single-output production function can be 
represented by ))(()( uxgxfy   , where x  is a variable input, )(xf  is the production 
frontier describing the maximum output that can be attained with a given input level, and )(xg  is 
a function that captures the relationship between inputs and output variability. Variable  , 
representing production uncertainty, is assumed to be an independent and identically distributed 
standard normal random variable (0,1)N . The non-negative variable u  is assumed to be an 
independent and identically distributed truncation of the ),0( 2uN   that is related to firms’ 
technical inefficiencies. Hence,   2 uE u = a=  and   2
2 

uVar u = b= . If 0u , the 
producer is said to be fully efficient or to operate at the production frontier. Following Battese et 
al. (1997) and Kumbhakar (2002), the output mean and variability functions are defined at the 
frontier ( 0u ), hence )()(
0
xfyE
u
  and 20 )()( xgyVar u  . An input will cause 
production risk to increase (stay constant) [decrease] if  0( ) ( ) 0uVar y
x
    . If technical 
efficiency is defined as the ratio of observed output to maximum feasible output, the following 
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measure of technical inefficiency can be derived under the additive hypothesis: 
 
 ,, 0
( )1 1
( )
x u
x u
E y g xTI u
f xE y 
    . This measure depends on two factors: (1) the non-negative 
random variable u  and (2) the ratio ( )
( )
g x
f x
, which the firm can control through input use. Any 
increase in the standard deviation of output will increase inefficiency, while improving the output 
mean will reduce it. Essentially, the ratio ( )
( )
g x
f x
 weights the technical inefficiency random 
parameter according to the firm’s ability to manage both the stochastic and the deterministic 
components of production. In this regard, if a change in input use increases both ( )g x  and ( )f x  
in the same proportion, technical efficiency estimates will be left unaltered. However, a firm will be 
considered less efficient, for example, if it follows a production strategy that increases output 
variability at a quicker path than output mean. The additive theoretical framework has the 
desirable property that marginal expected products are not constrained to have the same signs 
as marginal risks. However, this framework can also have restrictive implications for measures of 
technical inefficiency. If technical inefficiency remains unaltered with varying input levels, the 
signs of the marginal expected product and risk are forced to be the same, which is precisely the 
desirable property that the Battese et al. (1997) and Kumbhakar (2002) models were designed to 
avoid. 
The multiplicative version of the previous model can be represented as (Kumbhakar 
2002): ( )(1 ) ( )y f x u g x    .2 Under such model, technical inefficiency can be expressed 
as: 
 
 ,, 0
( )1 1
( )
x u
x u
E y f xTI u u
f xE y 
      and does not depend on input use. Battese et al. (1997), 
argue that the additive model is likely to better represent production behaviour of developed 
                                                 
2 Here we follow Kumbhakar (2002) and use (1 )u  as an approximation of ue . 
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agricultural industries rather than traditional farming in developing countries. Since the measure 
of TI depends on the specification of the stochastic production frontier, it is very relevant to test 
the assumption of a linear versus a multiplicative specification. As it will be discussed in the 
empirical application and according to Battese et al.’s (1997) expectations, the additive model is 
found to outperform the multiplicative alternative. The superiority of the additive model involves 
technical efficiencies, to a certain extent, being controlled by producers through input use.  
It is thus clear that under the multiplicative framework any government program altering 
input use will not have a direct impact on farms’ technical efficiencies. However, government 
programs will be relevant under the additive specification. We now focus on studying these 
impacts.  
Kumbhakar (2002) extends Battese et al.’s (1997) model to accommodate producers’ 
attitudes towards risk. We extend Kumbhakar’s (2002) additive framework to allow for policy 
instruments and develop a comparative statics analysis to assess the effects of decoupling on 
technical inefficiency measures.  In order to formulate the optimization problem, it is assumed that 
producers take their decisions with the aim of maximizing the expected utility of wealth 
   0max ( ) max ( )x xE U W E U W y wx C    , where W  represents a farm’s total wealth 
normalized by output price ( p ), 0W  stands for a farm’s initial wealth, w  is the input price relative 
to the output price, and C  represents decoupled government payments.3 In following the 
framework developed by Kumbhakar (2002), we assume that risk comes only from production, 
but not from market conditions. Omission of price risk can be relevant if analyzing the impacts of 
policies that influence price variability. Though the effects of decoupled transfers on price 
variability are not likely to be very relevant, this is certainly an interesting topic that merits further 
research. The first-order condition of the expected utility maximization problem can be expressed 
as follows:  
                                                 
3 Initial wealth could be omitted from the model.  
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        x xE U' W f x +g x -u - w    0 , (1) 
 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives, )(xfx  represents input x ’s marginal output and 
 xg x  measures the marginal contribution of variable input x  to the output standard deviation. If 
we take expectations and divide throughout by  '( )E U W , expression (1) changes to: 
 
      0x xf x g x θ - λ - w+η=  (2) 
 
where   is a normally distributed error term that measures the departure from the optimality 
condition (allocative inefficiency), expression   x xRP g x θ - λ  represents the marginal risk 
premium, which will be positive (zero) [negative] if variable input x  is risk decreasing (neutral) 
[increasing] and if producers are averse to risk, and   
E U' W
E U' W
      
 and   
E U' W u
E U' W
      
 
capture producers’ risk attitudes. In case producers are averse to risk, 0   and 0  (see 
Kumbhakar 2002 for further detail). Risk-aversion functions have opposite signs because of the 
opposite effects on production of   and u .  
 If we approximate the utility of wealth using a second-order Taylor-series expansion at  
0  u= , the following forms of the risk preference functions can be derived:     
Rg x
1+Rg x a
 
and 
  
 
2 2a+Rg x a b
1+Rg x a
  , where R  represents the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion. Following Kumbhakar (2002), we assume R  to be a function of a farm’s expected 
wealth which can be represented by the following expression: 1
( )
( )
WW
0
W
UR= - =
U
     , where 
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0  and 1  are parameters, and 0 ( )    W f x wx C  . If farmers are risk averse (risk neutral) 
[risk lovers], then   < 0R> = . We assume farmers to be risk averse. If parameter   1 0     
then producers are characterized by decreasing (constant) [increasing] absolute risk aversion 
(DARA (CARA) [IARA]). A substantial number of previous analyses that have tested for risk 
preferences have provided evidence in favour of DARA (Isik and Khanna 2003; Saha 1997; Bar-
Shira et al. 1997). 
 To assess the impacts of decoupled programs on farms’ technical inefficiencies, we carry 
out a comparative statics analysis. Agricultural policies in developed economies have traditionally 
involved the use of coupled measures of income support such as price supports that have kept 
market prices at artificial levels. Agricultural policy decoupling processes have usually involved a 
decline in output price supports in favour of more decoupled transfers. It is thus interesting to 
compare the effects of decoupled transfers with the impacts of market prices that have a coupled 
element of support. As a result, we extend our comparative statics analysis to a consideration of 
the impacts of a change in w , representing the input price normalized by the output price, on 
farms’ technical inefficiencies. The comparative statics results can be summarized in the following 
propositions (proofs are presented in the appendix).  
 
PROPOSITION 1. Within the framework of a stochastic frontier model with additive 
heteroskedastic error structure, under the assumption of positive expected marginal productivity 
and for a risk-averse producer and a risk-increasing input:  
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a. 
( )( )( )0  ( ) , 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )  
( ) ( )
( )( )0                   
( ) ( )
x
x
x
x
x
x
f xTI f x
C g x g x
f xf x
g x g x
f xTI f x
C g x g x
    
 
  
under  DARA preferences and  as well  as under  IARA
risk attitudes and 
under  CARA preferences or  if  
  
                          

 
b. TI
w

  is of indeterminate sign. 
 
PROPOSITION 2. Within the framework of a stochastic frontier model with additive 
heteroskedastic error structure, under the assumption of positive expected marginal productivity 
and for a risk-averse producer and a risk-decreasing input:  
a. ( )[ ]0TI
C
     under DARA (CARA) [IARA] preferences. 
b. TI
w

  is of indeterminate sign. 
 
The comparative statics developed above provide evidence of the relevance of 
accounting for the influence of output risk, risk preferences, and technical inefficiencies when 
studying the effects of decoupling. We show that, within the framework of a stochastic frontier 
model with additive heteroskedastic error structure, an increase in decoupled government 
transfers will motivate an increase (decrease) in DARA (IARA) farmers’ technical inefficiencies if 
the input x  is risk decreasing. However, if the input is risk increasing, inefficiencies could both 
increase or decrease. Under DARA preferences, for example, they will decrease if 
( )( )
( ) ( )
x
x
f xf x
g x g x
 , i.e., when an increase in input use causes an increase in the output mean 
relatively bigger than the increase in production risk, and will increase otherwise. This result is 
relevant and contrasts with the popular belief that decoupled government transfers are most likely 
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to increase “inside-farm” inefficiencies. The comparative statics analysis also proves that the 
effects of a change in normalized input prices (w ) on farms’ technical efficiencies cannot be 
predicted by theory. It can also be shown that a change in output price supports cannot be 
predicted by theory either, making it necessary to resolve the question empirically, which will be 
done in the next sections. 
Before concluding this section, it is relevant to note that, according to Chambers and 
Quiggin (2000), conventional stochastic frontier models do not correctly capture the stochastic 
decision environment in which firms take their decisions. Following these authors, the stochastic 
random variable ( ) in stochastic frontier models is primarily employed to capture measurement 
errors or missing variables, not representing the uncertain conditions under which production 
takes place. To overcome this limitation, they propose an alternative model based on the state-
contingent approach. O’Donnell et al. (2006) use simulation methods based on the state-
contingent approach and show that failure to account properly for the stochastic elements of 
production can give rise to spurious measures of efficiency. Consequently, results presented in 
this paper should be interpreted with care. While we acknowledge the potential limitations of our 
approach, we would like to note that, unfortunately, data requirements to apply a state-allocable 
approach are usually unavailable4 (O’Donnell et al. 2006; Quiggin and Chambers 2006).  
                                                 
4 Input allocations across crops, which we do not observe, would be needed to estimate flexible state-allocable  
models. O’Donnell and Griffiths (2006) propose an estimation approach based on a finite mixtures framework that, in 
the words of O’Donnell et al. (2006) offers “some promise of being able to identify flexible stochastic technologies.”   
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3. Model specification 
 
We generalize the model developed in the previous section to allow for two variable inputs, 1x  
and 2x , and two quasi-fixed inputs 3x  and 4x , where 1x  represents the quantity used of 
pesticides and insecticides, 2x  is a composite input including both fertilizer and seeds used in 
the production process, 3x  stands for a farm’s labour and 4x  represents capital inputs. Since 
production for the farms in the sample is characterized by constant returns to scale,5 the variables 
used in the analysis are expressed on a per acre basis (see the next section for further detail). It 
is assumed that the deterministic component of production follows a quadratic specification and is 
defined as: 4 4 41 2 3 4 0 1 1 1( , , , ) i i ji j ii j if x x x x x x x          where the alphas are 
parameters. The stochastic component of production is defined as a linear function: 
1 2 0 1 1 2 2( , )g x x x x     , being 0 , 1 , and 2  parameters. The conclusions derived from 
our theoretical model are robust to any specification of the production function.  
 We estimate both the multiplicative and the additive models using maximum likelihood 
(ML) techniques (see next paragraph for more detail). Using Pollak and Wales (1991) likelihood 
dominance criterion for testing non-nested hypotheses and Akaike’s information criterion, we find 
the additive model to clearly dominate the multiplicative one (see table 1).6 This shows the 
importance of using flexible specifications when testing for farms’ technical inefficiencies.  
“Table 1 near here” 
                                                 
5 The hypothesis of constant returns to scale was tested using both a Cobb-Douglas and a quadratic specification 
for the production function. At the data means, returns to scale are close to 1.02 under both specifications. A Wald 
test for constant returns to scale generated values of 1.3 under the Cobb-Douglas specification and 1.35 for the 
quadratic model. In both cases, the null hypothesis is comfortably accepted. 
6 As Pollack and Wales (1991) explain, if the two models contain the same number of parameters, both the 
dominance ordering and the likelihood dominance criteria will always prefer the hypothesis with the higher likelihood. 
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With the additive model, the system of first-order conditions can be expressed as follows: 
 
 
    
    1 1
2 2
1 2 3 1 2 1 1
1 2 3 4 1 2 2 2
x 4 x
x x
f x ,x x x +g x ,x - - w + =0
f x ,x x x +g x ,x - - w + =0
  
  

, ,
, ,
. (3) 
 
 The model is estimated using the two-stage ML procedure proposed by Kumbhakar 
(2002).7 In the first stage, ML methods are applied to estimate the stochastic frontier model. After 
estimating production parameters, we derive estimates for u  and TI following Kumbhakar and 
Lovell (2000, chapter 3). In the second step, risk preference parameters are derived by estimating 
the system of first-order conditions in (3), conditional on the parameters obtained in the first step, 
by full information ML. In order to be able to determine the impacts of decoupling on farmers’ 
technical inefficiencies, we compute the elasticities of TI with respect to government payments 
and prices. The price elasticity is computed assuming that it is the output price (not the input 
prices) that changes, thus yielding a single elasticity. To compute TI elasticities, we use formulas 
(4) and (5) in the appendix and adapt them to our two-variable and two semi-fixed input model.  
   
 
                                                 
7 As Kumbhakar (2002) notes, the single-step ML approach is computationally demanding relative to the two-step 
method that he uses in his empirical implementation. Though we tried to estimate all parameters in a single step, the 
optimization process failed to converge. This is why we decided to estimate the model using the two-stage process. 
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4. Empirical implementation 
 
In recent years, the world has witnessed important agricultural policy reforms that have been 
characterized by a certain degree of decoupling. Not being an exception to this reform trend, the 
United States’ overall farm policy underwent substantial alterations with the 1996 Federal 
Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act. These reforms involved a reduction in price 
support payments in favour of decoupled transfers, the Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) 
payments, and a deficiency payment program aimed at guaranteeing a minimum support price for 
program crops. According to USDA baseline policy variables (see USDA 2000), marketing 
assistance loan rates for the crops considered in our analysis were reduced by 6.3 per cent over 
the period of analysis. PFC payments were continued with the 2002 Farm Bill under the name of 
Fixed Direct Payments, and crop loan rates were rebalanced with soybean rates falling while 
other commodity rates were increased slightly. 
Eligibility for the seven-year PFC payments required a farm operator to have a planting 
history of a contract commodity for at least one of the previous five years, or otherwise to have 
land enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) with a planting history of a contract 
commodity. New entrants could become program participants on the basis that they purchased or 
share rented land already under PFC. The effects of government cash transfers on land values 
have been widely considered by the literature (see, for example, Barnard et al. 1997; Goodwin 
and Ortalo-Magné 1992; Weersink et al. 1999; Just and Miranowski 1993; Schertz and Johnston 
1998) and there seems to be a general agreement that economic rents from policy are likely to 
influence land prices which in turn is likely to cause changes in relative input prices. In that we 
consider PFC payments as fully decoupled, our model does not capture these changes, which 
certainly constitute an interesting avenue for future research.  
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 The aim of our empirical analysis is to assess the influence of government payments on 
production inefficiencies of a sample of Kansas farmers. Farm-level data are taken from farm 
account records from the Kansas Farm Management Association dataset for the years 1998 to 
2001. Retrospective data for these farms are used to approximate farm-level PFC as described 
later in this section.8 The FAIR Act PFC payments correspond to our definition of fixed payments 
per farm. Means and standard deviations for the data used are listed in table 2. Other sources 
that contain aggregate data are also employed to define some variables unavailable from the 
Kansas dataset. These sources are the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the BRIDGE database. From NASS, we 
derive country-level price indices and state-level output prices and quantities; state-level 
marketing assistance loan rates and PFC payment rates are obtained from USDA, while BRIDGE 
provided futures prices. 
The Kansas Farm Management Association dataset collects financial and production 
information for full-time commercial holdings in Kansas. The average value of farm production in 
2001 was $214,664 for the farms in the dataset and remained more or less constant during the 
period of analysis. Net farm income, averaging $27,995 in 2001 is subject to considerable 
fluctuations. Crop production and government payments represent around 80% of the value of 
the farm production, with corn, wheat, soybeans and sorghum being the predominant crops in the 
state (Albright 2002). During the period of analysis, each farm in our sample had, on average, 
1,081 acres of cropland, of which 82% was planted to these commodities that were mainly 
produced on dryland. Fertilizer and lime, seeds and crop protection products represent the most 
relevant crop-specific costs which are more than a fourth of total farm operating expenses. 
Machinery and equipment-related expenses, excluding financial expenses, represent around 17% 
                                                 
8 To be able to do so, a balanced panel of 549 farms was built out of our sample. 
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of operating expenses. Conversely, hired labour is only 6% of operating expenses, though it is 
relevant to note that unpaid family and operator labour are the predominant form of labour in this 
farming system.  
“Table 2 near here” 
Our database does not provide information on the allocation of variable inputs across 
crops. Hence, we define a single output category ( y ) that aggregates the production of wheat, 
corn, grain sorghum, and soybeans—the predominant crops in Kansas. Davis et al. (2000), by 
extending the generalized composite commodity theorem, provide support for consistent 
aggregation of U.S. agricultural production into as few as two categories: crops and livestock. 
Variable y  is defined as an implicit quantity index and is computed as the ratio of production in 
currency units to the output price index. Because our database does not contain information on 
market prices, we use price indices as a proxy. Specifically, we build an expected Paasche price 
index by defining expected unit prices for each crop and using state-level production data. 
Expected prices are approximated as the maximum between the expected cash price and the 
assistance loan rate, thus explicitly taking into account price supports. The expected cash price is 
defined as the futures price adjusted by the basis, the latter being the five previous years’ 
average of the wedge between the cash price (state-level output price) and the futures price. The 
futures price is approximated as the daily average price registered during the planting season for 
the harvest month contract. As noted above, since production for the farms in our sample is 
characterized by constant returns to scale, we express the variables in the model on a per acre 
basis, by dividing them by the acres planted to the crops considered. 
Input 1x  includes the use of pesticides and insecticides, while 2x  is a composite input 
that represents fertilizer and seeds. Input prices are measured using national input price indices. 
Variables 1x  and 2x  are defined as implicit quantity indices. Variable 3x , representing farms’ 
labour, is expressed in “productive work units” as a fraction of a 10-hour per day. Variable 4x , 
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representing capital inputs, includes the value of machinery and other equipment used in the 
production process. The Kansas database does not register PFC government payments. In its 
place, a single measure including all government payments received by each farm is available. 
We estimate farm-level PFC payments by approximating the acreage of the program crops (base 
acreage) and the base yield for each crop using farm-level data. Approximating base acreage 
and yields requires using data corresponding to the period shortly after 1985. Base acres were 
originally determined in the early 1980s. With the 1985 Food Security Act, a farm’s crop base 
acreage was set equal to the arithmetic average of the acreage planted to that crop during the 
five previous years. If a producer overplanted the base acreage, she would be ineligible for the 
payments that year. The 1985 Act also froze program yields at 1985 levels. Therefore, and as 
Smith and Glauber (1997) note, most links at the farm level between current production decisions 
and deficiency payments had been severed by 1986. Following this argument, we use the 1986-
1988 average acreage and yield for each program crop and farm.  
Following the 1996 FAIR Act provisions (see Young and Shields 1986), PFC payments 
per crop are computed by multiplying 0.85 by the base acreage, yield, and the PFC payment rate 
which, as noted above, is taken from USDA. PFC payments per crop are then added to get total 
direct payments per farm. This estimate is compared to actual government payments received by 
each farm. If estimated PFC payments exceed actual payments, the first measure is replaced by 
the second. This happens to 7 per cent of our observations. A farm’s initial wealth is defined as 
the farm’s net worth. 
“Table 3 near here” 
“Table 4 near here” 
Production function parameter estimates are presented in table 3. Parameter estimates 
for the stochastic element of production provide evidence that variable inputs exert a positive and 
statistically significant influence on output variability. Hence, both variable inputs are risk 
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increasing, i.e., 1 2( , ) 0ixg x x   for 1,2i = , which is compatible with Serra et al. (2006). While 
fertilizers have traditionally been considered as risk-increasing inputs, pesticides have often been 
regarded as risk-decreasing factors. Contrary to common belief, Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1994) 
show that pesticides can increase output variability in a number of situations. More specifically, 
they prove that pesticides will increase output risk whenever pest populations increase with 
favourable crop growth conditions. As explained above, first-stage parameter estimates allow 
deriving estimates for the technical inefficiency stochastic term, as well as for the technical 
inefficiency measure. The mean and standard deviation of the estimator of u  are, respectively, 
0.96 and 0.35, yielding a mean TI equal to 0.30 with a standard deviation of 0.12. The frequency 
distribution of TI is presented in table 5. Our technical inefficiency estimates are above Villano et 
al. (2005) who, using the Kumbhakar (2002) framework, derived mean TI levels of 0.12 for 
lowland rice farms in the Philippines, but are closer to other estimates by Giannakas et al. (2003) 
for a sample of Greek olive farms, Karagiannis and Tzouvelekas (2005) for a sample of Greek 
sheep holdings, or Kumbhakar et al. (1991) for a sample of U.S. dairy farms. Parameter 
estimates for the system of first-order conditions (3), which are presented in table 4, are all 
statistically significant and provide evidence that farms in our sample exhibit DARA preferences. 
These parameters allow predicting the coefficient of absolute risk aversion whose mean is 0.018 
(see table 4). The coefficient of relative risk aversion is compatible with the findings of Love and 
Buccola (1990). Our results yield mean values for   and   on the order of -0.46 and 1.28, which 
are compatible with Villano et al. (2005). 
“Table 5 near here” 
 Frequency distributions of technical inefficiency elasticities with respect to decoupled 
payments and output prices are offered in tables 6 and 7. The effects of both decoupled and 
coupled payments cannot be predicted by our theoretical model and need to be empirically 
determined. The generalization of the model to a consideration of more than one input and the 
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fact that all variable inputs are found to be risk increasing preclude this prediction. Table 6 shows 
that virtually all farms will increase their production inefficiencies as a response to an increase in 
PFC payments. As explained in the theoretical section, this situation will occur whenever a 
change in input allocation causes a change in the output mean smaller than the change in output 
risk. The increase in TI is compatible with decoupled payments being government transfers not 
linked to production or yields. Because these payments are constant and do not increase with 
higher production levels or different land allocations, they provide planting flexibility to farmers 
and we would expect that they may involve a reduction in input use and production levels relative 
to a scenario with price-supports. Farmers receiving a fixed government transfer every year may 
have fewer incentives to efficiently work the land relative to farmers relying on (supported) market 
prices as their single income source. Our results seem to confirm this hypothesis. It is important 
to note however that elasticity values are very small, indicating that large changes in payments 
are required to generate substantial impacts. This result is consistent with previous research 
(Hennessy 1998).  
For practically all farmers, a decline in output price supports will result in an increase in TI 
(see table 7). This is again consistent with changes in input use having stronger impacts on the 
output mean than on the output standard deviation. It is important to recall here that our analysis 
does not assess the impacts of decoupled programs on the entry/exit decision and the 
consequent changes in the distribution of the technical inefficiency parameter. In a scenario 
where the number of farms is assumed to remain constant, our model shows that farmers may 
respond to a decline in price supports by reducing the efficiency with which they operate. This is 
compatible with reduced motivation to produce efficiently as a response to the lower rents derived 
from producing. Further, this result reinforces the positive value of the payment elasticity. In light 
of the previous results, we can conclude that a policy-reform process consisting of a reduction in 
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output price supports and an increase in decoupled government transfers may involve an 
increase in TI levels.  
“Tables 6 and 7 near here” 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Previous literature on the effects of decoupling has focused on determining the impact of 
decoupled government transfers on input use and output levels. However, to our knowledge, no 
analysis has attempted to assess the effects of decoupling on farms’ technical inefficiency levels. 
Some studies on technical efficiencies have combined the conventional stochastic frontier models 
and Just and Pope’s (1978) specification of production, yielding stochastic frontier models with 
additive heteroskedastic error structures (Battese et al. 1997). We find the additive model to 
better represent production behaviour of our sample of Kansas farms than the more restrictive 
multiplicative framework. Additive models yield a measure of technical inefficiencies that does not 
only depend on the stochastic technical inefficiency effect, but which also depends on input use. 
Specifically, technical inefficiencies are found to have a positive relationship with the variance of 
output and a negative relationship with production mean. Hence, a decoupling process that alters 
a farm’s input use will also impact on its technical inefficiency levels.  
 We present a theoretical model to assess the impacts of decoupling on production 
inefficiencies. Our paper focuses on “inside-farm” technical inefficiencies and does not enter into 
the question of the impacts of decoupled programs on the entry-exit decision and on the 
consequent changes in the distribution of the technical inefficiency parameter. Our model is 
based on the model developed by Kumbhakar (2002) who extends Battese et al.’s (1997) 
framework to a consideration of economic agents’ risk preferences. We extend this framework to 
include policy instruments and develop a comparative statics analysis to study the impacts of 
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decoupling on TI. This analysis shows the relevance of accounting for the influence of output risk, 
risk preferences, and technical inefficiencies when studying the effects of decoupling. We show 
that an increase in decoupled transfers will motivate an increase (decrease) in DARA (IARA) 
farmers’ technical inefficiencies if input x  is risk decreasing. However, if the input is risk 
increasing, inefficiencies could both increase or decrease. This result is relevant and contrasts 
with the widespread belief that decoupled government transfers will increase “inside-farm” 
inefficiencies.  
Compatible with the findings of Leathers and Quiggin (1991), the effects of coupled 
payments on TI cannot be predicted by theory. We use farm-level data collected in Kansas to 
illustrate the model. Our results show that, for an overwhelming majority of farms, an increase in 
decoupled payments will increase farms’ technical inefficiencies. This result is compatible with 
decoupled payments being government transfers not linked to production or yields. Because  
higher production yields are not receiving any premiums, incentives to produce the maximum 
attainable output may be reduced. Previous research has shown that decoupled government 
transfers may have only minor or no impact on input use. Consistently with this research, PFC 
payment elasticities are very small requiring relevant changes to these payments to generate 
substantial impacts. Our results also show that farmers may respond to a decline in price 
supports by reducing the efficiency with which they operate. This result thus reinforces the 
positive value of payment elasticities, in that lower rents derived from producing are found to 
reduce the motivation to produce efficiently.  
 Our analysis is necessarily constrained by data availability. As noted above, failure to 
account properly for the stochastic elements of production can give rise to spurious measures of 
efficiency. Collecting data on input allocations across crops, which we do not observe, would 
allow estimating flexible state-allocable models to then determine to what extent our results may 
be biased. 
 22
Appendix 
 
Proof of propositions 1 and 2. The effects of decoupled payments can be determined as follows: 
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captures the marginal impact of a change in input use on the technical inefficiency measure. 
Formula (4) shows that a change in decoupled government transfers will induce a change in input 
consumption, which will in turn alter a farm’s measure of technical inefficiency. An increase in 
government transfers will increase (leave constant) [decrease] DARA (CARA) [IARA] farmers’ 
willingness to assume more risk, thus reducing (leaving constant) [increasing] the Arrow-Pratt 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion. This change in risk attitudes will cause   to increase 
(remain constant) [decrease] and   to decrease (remain constant) [increase] under DARA 
(CARA) [IARA], involving a marginal risk premium of a smaller (equal) [bigger] magnitude in 
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absolute terms. The sign of 
C
x
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   under CARA, and  ( ) 0
x
C
     under IARA. Hence, 
our results show that under DARA preferences for example, an increase in decoupled 
government payments will increase the demand for risk-increasing inputs, while reducing the 
application of the risk-reducing ones. This result is compatible with the findings of MacMinn and 
Holtmann (1983) and represents an extension of their work. While the sign of 
C
x

   can be 
predicted by theory, one cannot forecast the sign of 
x
TI

 . Under the assumption that the 
expected marginal productivity is positive, this expression will be negative if x  is a risk-
decreasing input. However, if the input is risk increasing, 
x
TI

  could be either positive or 
negative. 
The impacts of a change in normalized input prices can be computed as follows:  
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Expression (5) shows that a change in normalized input prices will induce a change in 
input allocation, which will in turn alter a farm’s technical inefficiency. An increase in w  will 
decrease (leave constant) [increase] DARA (CARA) [IARA] farmers’ willingness to assume more 
risk, which will cause an increase (no change) [a decrease] in the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion. This in turn will cause   to decrease (stay constant) [increase] and   to 
increase (stay constant) [decrease]. The absolute value of the marginal risk premium will increase 
(stay constant) [decrease]. The sign of 
w
x

  also depends on the sign of    1    w wxg x , 
thus not being possible to anticipate whether input use and technical efficiencies will increase or 
decrease with a change in normalized input prices. 
 The results in our comparative statics analysis are compatible with Leathers and Quiggin 
(1991) who claim that the sign of  
w
x

  is ambiguous for risk-reducing inputs if farmers are 
characterized by DARA preferences. Leathers and Quiggin (1991), however, state that the Just 
and Pope production function yields a representation of risk that is specially restrictive for risk-
reducing inputs, thus making models of this type unsatisfactory for this sort of inputs. Finally, we 
should note that, as an anonymous referee points out, more recent work by Chambers and 
Quiggin (2000) confirms that increases in input prices will lead to non-negative changes in input 
demands irrespective of risk attitudes and input types. 
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Table 1    Model selection 
 
Additive  
model 
 
Multiplicative 
model 
 
Log likelihood  12,145.29 11,538.63 
Akaike information criteria 0.74 4.04 
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Table 2    Summary statistics for the variables of interest 
Variable Mean 
(Standard deviation) 
n= 2,196 
y  112.09 
(64.16) 
1x  16.27 
(14.28) 
w1  1.08 
(0.06) 
2x  39.96 
(33.17) 
w2  1.12 
(0.09) 
3x  0.53 
(1.24) 
4x  237.51 
(226.50) 
C  14.40 
(11.45) 
0W  1,073.92 
(1,505.53) 
Note: all monetary values are expressed in constant 1998 currency units. 
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Table 3    Parameter estimates and summary statistics for the production function 
Parameter Value 
(Standard error) 
Deterministic component 
of production 
Stochastic component 
of production 
 0  83.1112* 
(3.3205) 
 
 1  2.1017* 
(0.2543) 
 
 2  1.0480* 
(0.0773) 
 
3  -51.7559* 
(3.8940) 
 
4  0.1178* 
(0.0179) 
 
11  0.0123* 
(0.5241E-02) 
 
22  -0.7333E-03 
(0.5057E-03) 
 
33  4.8137* 
(0.7999) 
 
44  -0.5416E-04* 
(0.1094E-04) 
 
12  0.0214* 
(0.3284E-02) 
 
13  -1.0500* 
(0.1201) 
 
14  -1.3480E-02* 
(0.5158E-03) 
 
23  -0.2013* 
(0.0378) 
 
24  0.1829E-03 
(0.1245E-03) 
 
34  0.0185* 
(0.6873E-02) 
 
Note: An asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance at the α = 0.05 level. 
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Table 3 Parameter estimates and summary statistics for the production function (continued) 
Parameter Value 
(Standard error) 
Deterministic component 
of production 
Stochastic component 
of production 
0  
 
25.4861* 
(0.6207) 
1  
 
1.4737* 
(0.0586) 
2  
 
0.0564* 
(0.0135) 
2
u  
 
1.6133* 
(0.1641) 
Wald Test 24,290.57* 
Note: An asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance at the α = 0.05 level. 
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Table 4    Parameter estimates and summary statistics for the coefficients of risk aversion 
Parameter Mean predicted value 
(Standard deviation) 
0  0.0213* 
(0.0002) 
1  -2.82E-06* 
(8.933E-09) 
  -0.4603 
(0.3258) 
  1.2833* 
(0.1910) 
R  
Absolute risk aversion 
0.0179* 
(0.0042) 
Relative risk aversion 14.9953 
(33.6683) 
Wald test  653,596.000* 
Note: An asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance at the α = 0.05 level. 
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Table 5    Frequency distribution of technical efficiency ratings for Kansas farms, 1998-2001 
Inefficiency (%) 1998 1999 2000 2001 
<10 11 14 11 2 
10-20 115 91 77 68 
20-30 237 206 167 166 
30-40 122 148 166 164 
40-50 39 55 84 89 
>50 23 35 36 50 
N 547 549 541 539 
mean 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.32 
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Table 6    Frequency distribution of payment elasticities for Kansas farms, 1998-2001 
Payment elasticity 1998 1999 2000 2001 
_ 0.001TI CE    2 2 1 0 
_0.001 0TI CE    3 8 5 7 
_0 0.0004TI CE   400 399 410 472 
_0.0004 0.0008TI CE   119 103 109 52 
_0.0008 0.003TI CE   22 35 15 8 
_ 0.003TI CE   1 2 2 1 
N 547 549 542 540 
mean 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 
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Table 7    Frequency distribution of price elasticities for Kansas farms, 1998-2001 
Payment elasticity 1998 1999 2000 2001 
_ 5TI pE    0 0 0 0 
_5 2TI pE     5 16 10 40 
_2 1TI pE     86 119 135 158 
_1 0TI pE    453 412 396 341 
_ 0TI pE   3 2 0 0 
N 547 549 541 539 
mean -0.5963 -0.7339 -0.7920 -0.9337 
 
